Archive for the ‘Equitable Liens’ Category

Surcharge of Exempt Assets – Failure to Disclose and Dissipation of Assets

August 5, 2007

On May 11, 2007, the court in In re Mazon, ___ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 1437370 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.)(Williamson, J.) issued its decision on an issue on which [t]here is no Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case or any Florida case – either bankruptcy court or district court…” But the court noted that other courts around the country have had the occasion to consider the issue – the issue being whether a trustee should be permitted to surcharge exempt property in exceptional circumstances such as where there has been a material failure to disclose estate assets that are subsequently dissipated. The court concluded that pursuant to its authority under section 105 and its inherent powers, it may equitably surcharge statutorily exempt property where the debtor has failed to schedule and turn over estate assets, but could not equitably surcharge an exempt Florida homestead unless the estate assets can be traced into the acquisition of an interest in the homestead.

The court noted that the only explicit reference to a right to surcharge in the bankruptcy code is found in section 506(c), but that this section is limited to a trustee’s right to recover the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of preserving or disposing of property securing a claim to the extent that the secured claimant has benefits. Section 506(c) states that “[t]trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim.”

The court noted that although the bankruptcy code does not explicitly provide for the remedy of surcharge against a debtor’s exemptions, that bankruptcy judges have broad authority to prevent abuse of process pursuant to section 105 which authority was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___ (2007). Furthermore as noted in Marrama, even if section 105(a) had not been enacted, every federal court possesses the inherent power to sanction abusive litigation practices which may provide an adequate justification for a remedy when faced with a debtor’s active misconduct to take advantage of the bankruptcy systems for improper purposes as occurred in Marrama and has occurred in the case before the court. The court also noted that the Supreme Court has also recognized that bankruptcy courts have long relied upon their inherent equitable powers in passing on and preventing “a wide range of problems arising out of the administration of bankruptcy estates.” Pepper v. Litton, , 308 U.S. 295 (1939). Accordingly, the court surcharged the assets that the debtors had claimed as exempt under Florida statutory exemptions. These assets included the debtors’ 401k retirement accounts and the cash value of a life insurance policy.

The court found though that Florida law does not permit or authorize a surcharge against the debtors’ constitutionally allowed homestead exemption. The court based its decision on Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.2001) in which the Florida Supreme Court at the request of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a debtor is entitled to Florida’s homestead exemption when the debtor acquired the homestead using non-exempt funds with the specific intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and held that so long as the funds being used to pay down a mortgage or buy the homestead were not acquired by fraud or under egregious circumstances, the homestead exemption cannot be denied. The court in Havaco noted that article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution expressly only provides for three narrow exceptions to the homestead exemption.

The court stated that the Trustee was essentially asking the court to impose an equitable lien against the debtors’ homestead as a means to collect on the obligation of the debtors to turn over estate property. The court cited to In re Chauncey, 454 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir.2206) where the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed that an equitable lien may be imposed under Florida law only when money used to obtain an interest in the homestead property is obtained by fraud or egregious conduct. The focus then would be on how the money is obtained and no upon how is is used. Money lawfully obtained that is thereafter improperly used does not support the imposition of an equitable lien against homestead property. Under the facts of this case, the court held that an equitable lien or surcharge against the homestead were not appropriate as the money and property were not diverted to acquire the interest in the homestead.

In Non-Bankruptcy Court, Florida’s Homestead Exemption "Rules"

July 7, 2007

The Florida homestead exemption “rules” – at least generally in non-bankruptcy courts. In the recent case of Brian Dowling v. Davis, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1839555 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 2007), Plaintiff Dowling held an Illinois judgment and filed a three count complaint in the District Court of the Middle District of Florida for 1. fraudulent asset conversion under Fla. Stat. Section 222.30, 2. to impose an equitable lien, and 3. to avoid fraudulent transfers Fla. Stat. Section 726.101, et. seq. The Illinois judgment was obtained in 2002 and the married defendants purchased real property in Florida in 2003 as tenants by the entirety. The purchase money was comprised of a bank loan and personal funds. The Defendants maintained that Florida’s constitutionally-created homestead exemption protected their Florida residence.

The Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s claims failed as the Florida Supreme Court has expressly held “[t]hat the transfer of nonexempt assets into an exempt homestead with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is not one of the three exceptions to the homestead exemption provided for in article X, section 4″ of the Florida Constitution. Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1028 (Fla. 2001)(“Havoco I”) (emphasis added); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 255 F.3d 1321,1322 (11th Cir. 2001)(“Havoco II”) ( affirming that judgment debtor’s purchase of home with intent to hinder creditors did not overcome homestead exemption, based on answer to certified question in Havoco I). The Court stated that “the homestead exemption does not contain an express exception for real property that is acquired in Florida for the sole purpose of defeating the claims of out-of-state creditors. Havoco II, 255 F.3d at 1322; Havoco I,790 So. 2d at 1028; Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Lung, 898 F. Supp. 883,887 (S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Adell, 321 B.R. 562,569-70 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).

The Court further noted that equitable liens may only be imposed in limited circumstances where a debtor fraudulently procured funds to invest in, purchase, or improve a homestead. See Palm Beach Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1993) (affirming imposition of equitable lien against wife’s residence where debtor husband obtained mortgage by fraud); Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127,129-30 (Fla. 1925) (affirming imposition of equitable lien in action by trustee of bankrupt corporation against former president for embezzling funds used to improve homestead). The Plaintiff did not argue that this type of fraud was perpetrated against him but only alleged that Defendant purchased a homestead knowing that a judgment was imminent and used funds that could have been used to satisfy the judgment. The Court further noted that the exceptions to the homestead exemption are to be strictly construed. Havoco I, 790 So.2d at 1021-22.

One may query what the result may have been if these facts and issues had arisen in a bankruptcy case (voluntary or involuntary) under the full panoply of the BAPCPA amendments. See e.g. section 522(o) (reduction of homestead for dispositions made during prior 10 years with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor), 522 (p) (cap on homestead acquired within 1215 with certain exceptions), 522(b) (domicile and exemptions). Perhaps the homestead exemption would have been reduced or capped. Perhaps the Florida homestead exemption would not have applied at all and the Defendant/Debtor would have been required to use the Illinois or Federal exemptions. Perhaps an attempt to exempt the real property as tenants by entireties property under 522(b)(3)(B) would have been subject to avoidance.